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he  Warsaw  climate  conference  (Conference  of Parties, COP19)  finally  resulted  in  a 
decision to agree on a timeframe for the new agreement due in COP21 in Paris in 2015, 
and ways to enhance the levels of ambition in pre-2020 mitigation pledges.1 Warsaw 
was  in  effect  a  halfway step  from  Durban,  where  Parties  agreed  to  develop  “a  protocol, 
another  legal  instrument  or  an  agreed  outcome  with  legal  force  under  the  Convention 
applicable to all Parties”2 (Decision/COP17), with a view to adopting it in COP21 in 2015 for 
its entry into effect and its implementation from 2020. It was crucial to ascertain whether 
indeed  all  Parties  are  on  board  and  ready  to  start  domestic  processes  in  order  to  come 
forward with proposals for post-2020 mitigation pledges on time.  
Hence, the Warsaw decision invites all Parties “to initiate or intensify domestic preparations 
for their intended nationally-determined contributions” and to communicate them well in 
advance of COP21 in Paris, by the 1st quarter of 2015 “in a manner that facilitates the clarity, 
transparency and understanding of the intended contributions”.3 This language refers to the 
importance of up-front clarity in the information to accompany Parties’ pledges. 
Changes in the institutional architecture and processes 
This new decision needs to be understood in light of the general shift in weight to domestic 
processes,  Parties’  motivations,  and  integrity  of  mitigation  and  development  in  climate 
policy.  One  of  the  lessons  learned  from  COP15  in  Copenhagen  is  that  Parties  came  to 
position  themselves  rather  than  negotiate  with other  Parties,  having  completed  domestic 
processes long before. It has been also observed that more than 90 countries, none of which 
were  necessarily  bound  by  the  legal  nature  of  commitments  or  actions,  were  willing  in 
Cancun to put forward their pledges to reduce or limit GHG emissions by 2020 and were 
ready  to  implement  them.4 In  addition,  the  Cancun  Agreements  encourage  developing 
                                                   
1 Decision, CP19, Further advancing the Durban Platform 
(http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/warsaw_nov_2013/decisions/application/pdf/cop19_adp.pdf). 
2 Decision 1, CP17. 
3 Decision, CP19, Further advancing the Durban Platform.  
4 To date, developed countries pledged economy-wide emission reduction targets (EERTs or ERTs) 
under  the  Convention  for  all,  and  quantified  emissions  limitations  or  reduction  commitments 
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countries to develop Low-Carbon Development Strategies (LCDS) or plans in the context of 
sustainable  development,5 which  could  be  understood  as  ‘green growth’ strategies  in  the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) context.6 The above 
shift  in  focus  has  been  further  underlined  by  a  structural  change  in  the  institutional 
architecture, as sketched out below.  
The  Kyoto-Bali  framework  can  be  regarded  as  a  closed  and  static  model:  allocating 
differentiated  carbon  constraints  to  selected  countries  according  to  their  historical 
responsibilities  and  capabilities,  and  fixing  the  status  quo  for  the  coming  decades.  In 
contrast, the post-Cancun framework can be viewed as an open and dynamic model: setting 
out enabling conditions and providing support for willing countries to do more, and leaving 
flexibility in adjustments to the initial level of ambition under changing circumstances. First-
movers would benefit most from the latter model to create and facilitate opportunities.  
In  the  run-up  to  Warsaw,  Parties  had  extensive  discussions  on  what  “applicable  to  all” 
means, and how to reconcile the concept with the principles of the Convention, “common 
but  differentiated  responsibilities”.  They  also  discussed  full  implementation  of  previous 
decisions,7 particularly in terms of the means of implementation that could enhance the pre-
2012 ambition. Whether the common word “contributions” adopted in Warsaw has the effect 
of  bridging  and  unifying  developed  and  developing  countries  remains  to  be  seen. 
Nevertheless,  the  general  structural  shift  to  the  dynamic  model  of  the  post-Cancun 
framework appears to be irreversible. 
Next steps 
Warsaw  produced  two  milestones:  i)  Parties  were  asked  to  communicate  “intended 
nationally-determined contributions” by March 2015 and ii) the Ad-hoc Working Group on 
the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action was requested to identify before COP20 in Lima, 
the information that Parties will provide when putting forward their contributions.8  
What would the Warsaw decision mean in practice? Here are some preliminary ideas about 
what is needed. 
International negotiation processes should take into account domestic processes for public 
recognition and support for the initial pledges tabled by policy-makers. 
Domestic processes should be informed and guided by latest science and impact assessment 
at  the  international  level  in  order  for  each  Party  to  reach  an  optimal  choice  over  policy 
options.  
Key to confidence-building among Parties would be the quality of information to accompany 
initial pledges as well as transparency and accountability in the level of ambition pledged. 
                                                                                                                                                               
(QELROs) under the second commitment period (2013-20) of the Kyoto Protocol for those assuming 
the commitments for this period. Developing countries pledged Nationally Appropriate Mitigation 
Actions (NAMAs) (http://unfccc.int/focus/mitigation/items/7169.php). 
5 Decision 1, CP16 (http://cancun.unfccc.int/mitigation/). 
6 N. Fujiwara, “Green growth in the context of the UNFCCC”, Background Note for the European 
Climate  Platform  Workshop,  Brussels,  18  October  2012  (www.ceps.eu/content/ecp-workshop-eu-
climate-change-policy-looking-ahead-doha).  
7 These decisions constitute the agreed outcome pursuant to the Bali Action Plan: Decisions 1/CP.18 
(Agreed  Outcome  pursuant  to  the Bali Action  Plan),  2  /CP.17  (Outcome  of  the Ad  Hoc Working 
Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention), 1/CP.16 (Cancun Agreements) and 
other relevant decisions.  
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The required information should be structured by pre-determined criteria and/or objective 
indicators. 
The weight of communication and dissemination would increase in both international and 
domestic processes.  
The choice of criteria and objective indicators would become crucial not only as a benchmark 
for comparison of different pledges (see iii), but also as a tool for communicating to and 
winning support from domestic constituencies (see iv).  
To  measure  against  the  pre-determined  criteria/indicators  and  to  collect  essential  data, 
domestic processes should involve major stakeholders, especially those with access to such 
data, clarifying the objective and scope of such exercise.  
Along  the  above  lines  of  thinking,  the  process  of  formulating  nationally-determined 
contributions  may  find  inspiration  in  the  operational  frameworks  designed  for  LCDS.  A 
vertical  framework  would  consist  of  three  levels:  enabling  conditions,  mainstreaming 
mechanisms and policy instruments.9 Such a framework could be adapted to a template for 
each  Party  to  complete  the  information  requested.  On  the  other  hand,  a  horizontal 
framework would be suitable to organise a process engaging policy-makers and stakeholders 
in  several  steps,  e.g.  planning,  implementation,  governance,  monitoring,  reporting  and 
verification.10 Such a framework could guide the process for each Party to take the first step, 
formulating  domestically  determined  contributions,  as  part  of  the  planning  stage.  Both 
vertical  and  horizontal  dimensions  focus  on  implementation  strategies  that  are  country-
driven,  non-prescriptive  but  flexible,  and  tailored  to  national  circumstances  and  specific 
needs.  
Lessons  learned  from  the  development  of  LCDS  would  be  particularly  relevant  to  the 
elaboration on the content and presentation of the information to be discussed at COP20 in 
Lima.  Should  the  numbers  and  figures  of  the  contributions  reveal  the  outline,  the 
accompanying information would tell the story behind the outline: how the numbers and 
figures  are  calculated,  which  indicators  are used  for  measurement  and  whether  they  are 
weighted. These stories will help us to clarify and better understand what and how each 
Party is trying to contribute to joint efforts, thereby raising the level of confidence. This will 
be an important step forward in the second half of the Durban Platform negotiations. 
                                                   
9 OECD 2012 in Fujiwara (2012), op. cit. 
10 See e.g. UNDP, ECN and OECD in Fujiwara (2012), op. cit. 